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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a game theoretic model to coordinate single manufacturer and multiple suppliers under demand 
uncertainty with asymmetric quality information. The paper addresses the manufacturer and its suppliers who are involved in 
purchasing and production with uncertain demands. Due to asymmetric information, the quality information of components 
purchased from suppliers is unknown to the manufacturer. Thus, we investigate two scenarios for the manufacturer to estimate 
uncertainty of risk.  The coordination problem is modeled by Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and suppliers 
are followers. An optimization approach is proposed to find an equilibrium under demand uncertainty. Computational results show 
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past years, the rapid growth of globalization 
has increased com  Many 
companies in the global business environment are facing 
fierce competition on price and quality simultaneously. 
Thus, global sourcing to countries such as China or India 
has become popular. Companies benefit from their low 
cost labor. However, companies fail to see the cost 
associated with varying quality levels from suppliers [1]. 
A lot of attempts have been made to model and optimize 
behaviors of various decision makers concerned with 
profit and quality. Banker et al. [2] have studied the 
intensity of competition and how competition influences 
the improvement of quality. Their paper has shown that 
the increased quality causes higher price as well as 
higher costs. Due to varying quality levels and prices of 
products from supplier, the manufacturer faces financial 
risks resulting from unexpected fluctuation of demand. 
Thus, the risk consideration is involved in our 
formulation. Nagurney et al. [3][4] have introduced 
supernetworks in which supply-side and demand-side 
risk are included. 
In this paper, we propose a game theoretic model to 
coordinate one manufacturer and multiple suppliers 
under demand uncertainty in order to improve quality of 
products. Stackelberg game is applied to resolve 
decision making of production, price, purchasing 
quantity of components simultaneously between the 
manufacturer and its suppliers. 
Hsish and Liu [5] introduce fours noncooperative 
games to explore the impact of quality investment on 
production and inspection.  Zhu et al. [6] proposes a 
quality improvement strategy along supply chain and 
addresses that both of buyer and seller have an incentive 
to invest in quality investment. Product quality in multi-
layer supply chain is investigated to consider the impact 
on production system by Shib [7].  
The quality problem has received intensive attention. 
Many researchers attempt to analyze various quality 
problems in a game theoretic model in order to explore 
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the impact of product quality in supply chain planning. 
However, most of researches assume that information is 
fully observed by players. In most real-life situations, 
observation is partial or incomplete. Thus, one question 
arises that how to coordinate channel partners in a game 
theoretic model while information is not fully observed.  
Tse and Tan [8] study the unclear information of 
quality risk and visibility in a multi-tier supply chain.  
They consider the situation of asymmetric information 
between manufacturer and supplier. However, they focus 
and visibility for supply chain planning. The 
coordination between manufacturers and suppliers is not 
mentioned. The majority of researches which considers 
supply chain in a game theoretic model with asymmetric 
information are concentrated on uncertain market or 
costs. However, in our paper, we focus on quality 
uncertainty in a game theoretic model.  For instance, 
Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul [9] introduce a seller-buyer 
supply chain model with an asymmetric information 
structure. They assume that only buyer knows demand 
setup cost and 
purchasing cost. Afterwards, Lei et al. [10] investigates 
the impact of asymmetric information on disruption 
management when disruptions of demand and costs are 
private information. 
In this paper, our main contribution is to characterize 
the optimal production, ordering quantity of raw 
materials price and quality level of components decided 
by suppliers in a game theoretic model where quality 
information is asymmetric. In our paper, we propose a 
solution approach to help decision making for 
manufacturers while the information of quality level is 
partially known. The coordination between the 
manufacturer and its suppliers is achieved by 
Stackelberg game.  There are two scenarios to evaluate 
uncertainty of risk for the manufacturer. We analyze a 
worst case and an average case to estimate uncertainty 
due to asymmetric information. A chance-constraint is 
imposed to estimate the worst case of risk analysis.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The 
problem description and modeling are described in 
Section 2.The solution approach is provided in Section 
3. Numerical examples are shown in Section 4. Finally, 
the paper concludes in section 5 with the expectation of 
the future work. 
2. Problem description  
2.1. Two echelon supply chain 
     The problem considered in the paper is a two echelon 
supply chain involving multiple suppliers Jj ,,1  
and one manufacturer where the manufacturer purchases 
different types of component Ii ,,1  from suppliers 
to assemble different products Kk ,,1 . The 
production, price of components, reliability of 
component and purchased quantity of components are 
determined simultaneously. 
2.2. Modeling risk and uncertainty 
Quality of components determined by suppliers is 
investigated. We consider that the cost of components 
ijh  paid by suppliers consists of two parts: production 
cost ijc  and quality investment which is expressed by 
cost function. The cost function is that suppliers pay 
quality investment cost ijv  to maintain the reliability of 
components at ije  level so that the components can be 
used to produce finished products. The reliability of 
components is measured by the reliability factor ij  
which is normally distributed such that ),(~ 2ijijij N . 
High value of variance ij  conceptually increases risk of 
failure that components cannot be used for production. 
Then, higher ij  provides lower reliability of 
components seen in Fig 1. 
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 Fig. 1:  Reliability and variance relation  
 
The manufacturer in our paper faces uncertain 
demand from customers. And, the actual risk of failure 
of components is also uncertain for the manufacturer. In 
other words, the actual quantity of defective components 
is unknown. We consider that suppliers suffer higher 
cost if they are willing to improve the reliability of 
components. In contrary, the manufacturer receives low 
reliability components if suppliers reduce cost of 
components. However, the manufacturer could not 
obtain complete quality information of components. 
Therefore, the manufacturer has to estimate an average 
case and a worst case due to incomplete information in 
order to avoid the loss. 
2.3. Relationship between manufacturer and suppliers 
The manufacturer and suppliers are followed by 
leader and follower relationship. The manufacturer and 
suppliers are coordinated non-cooperatively to determine 
order quantity, price of components and quality level of 
components. However, the amount of defective 
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components which are not used for production will be 
realized after delivery. Thus, full quality information of 
components could not obtained by the manufacturer 
during the negotiation. 
2.4. Formulation  
Indice 
i  : component for assembling finished products 
),,1( Ii   
j  : suppliers ),,1( Jj  
k  : products ),,1( Kk  
Decision variable 
Manufacturer:  
ijD  : quantity of component i  purchased from the 
supplier j  
ijX  : quantity of unexpected defective components i  
from supplier j  
ky : production quantity of finished products k  during 
the planning horizon 
Supplier: 
ijq : unit sales price of component i  for supplier j to 
manufacturer 
ijQ  : economic lot size of component i   for supplier j  
ij  : variance of quality of component i  for supplier j  
Parameter 
Manufacturer: 
)( kzf : probability density function followed by the 
demand of the product k  
ijRe  : random variable of  realized quantity of defective 
component i  for supplier j  follows a normal 
distribution where is 'ij  is mean value and 
'
ij  is 
variance 
kz : random variable of demand for product k  from the 
customers 
ij  : random variable to denote reliability factor that 
follows a normal distribution such that ),(~ 2ijijij N  
where ij  is mean value and ij  is variance 
Manufacturer: 
ka : opportunity cost for understocking of one unit of 
product  k  
kb : inventory holding cost for overstocking of one unit 
of product k   
ke : unit production cost for product k  
ikg : number of units of component i  required to 
produce one unit of product k  
ijo  : penalty loss cost due to unexpected defective 
components i  from supplier j  
kt : resources required by the manufacturer to produce 
one unit of product k  
kr : unit sale revenue cost for product k  
Supplier: 
ijc  : intrinsic cost of production for one unit component 
i  paid by supplier j  
ijh : cost paid by supplier j  in order to produce one unit 
component i  which is associated with quality level  
ijv  : cost paid by supplier j  for maintaining reliability 
of component i   
ij  : penalty cost for the defective component i  paid by 
supplier j  to the manufacturer 
ijA : intrinsic cost of production for one unit component 
i  paid by supplier j  
ijB  : price responsiveness to demand for one unit 
component i  paid by supplier j  
ijC  : price responsiveness to quality for one unit 
component i  paid by supplier j  
 : variance factor that variance of quality determined 
by suppliers is proportional to variance of realized 
quantity defective components  
 
The manufacturer purchases components ijD  from 
suppliers. After delivery, the manufacturer faces amount 
of defective components due to incomplete information. 
The objective function is the maximization of the total 
profit where the sale revenue minus inventory / 
opportunity loss cost, purchasing cost, production cost 
and unexpected loss cost of defective components. In the 
formulation, ijX  represents amount of unexpected 
defective components i  from supplier j  which is not 
known before delivery. 
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Subject to: 
1) Production capacity 
K
k kk Cyt1                                                              (2)        
2) BOM (Bills of material) 
K
k
J
j ijkik iDyg1 1 ,                                           (3) 
 
The manufacturer receives amount of defective 
components due to varying quality of components from 
different suppliers. Supplier should pay penalty cost for 
the defective components.  
The supp ctive function is formulated 
including sale revenue, cost of components and penalty 
cost for the defective components
objective is expressed by:                                                         
)],0[max()(max ijijijijijijj PReEcqD  
where     
ijijijijijij xCDBAc  
ijexij                                                                        (4)       
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Subject to:
1) Price constraint ijij hq (5)
After order is sent to suppliers, the suppliers will
determine price of components and reliability of 
components in order to maximize their own profits.
notice that the formulation cannot be solved directly due 
to unknown ijX . We propose a solution approach to
estimate ijX in order to reduce unexpected loss. The 
approach is to estimate the uncertainty of quantity of 
defective components. Therefore, the manufacturer 
could forecast situations which may face. The detailed
solution process is discussed in section 3.
3. Solution approach
the loss of
amount of defective component i for supplier j is 
unknown before order arrives. In order to avoid this 
unexpected loss, we propose an estimation solution for 
the manufacturer to evaluate the loss. Here, we consider 
two scenarios: an average case and a worst case.
3.1. Average case
Due to incomplete information, the manufacturer 
faces amount of defective components after delivery
from suppliers. Thus, the manufacturer should estimate
quantity of defective components beforehand. Let ijP
denote estimated quantity of defective components and
ijRe be a random variable of realized quantity of 
defective components. We assume that the manufacturer 
knows partial quality information of components. 
Therefore, the realized quantity of defective component
follows a normal distribution ),( '' ijij which is 
known by the manufacturer.
For the average case, once the estimated quantity of 
defective components is less than the realized quantity,
the manufacturer has to order extra components from the
outsourcing suppliers in order to achieve production.
However, the manufacturer is compensated by suppliers
because of amount of defective components. Thus, the
penalty loss cost for the manufacturer ijo is 
reformulated as
ijijijo
where ij is the penalty cost paid by suppliers, and ij is
the cost for the outsourcing suppliers to order 
components.
    The manufacturer s objective function for the
average case is the maximization of the total profit 
including the sale revenue of finished products while
minus inventory cost or opportunity loss cost, 
purchasing cost of components and production cost. The
last term represents is penalty cost of defective 
components. The formulation is as follows:
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Subject to (2), (5)
1) The actual quantity of non-defective components for 
assembling finished products before delivery is order 
quantity ijD minus estimated quantity of defective 
components ijP
K
k
J
j ijijkk PD
  y g 1 1 )
 ( (7)     
The supplier s function is written as:
)],0[max()(max ijijijijijijj PReEcqD
where
ijijijijijij xcDBAc
ijexij
Subject to: 1) Price constraint ijij hq
3.2.
The manufacturer and suppliers are analyzed as
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is a leader and
suppliers are followers. T
functions should be derived firstly. Then, the
rewritten as:
)],0[max(
)(max
ijijij
ijijijijijijijj
PReE
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The objective function can be reformulated by a 
normalization technique [11]. The calculation procedure 
is as follows:
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The resulting formulation is as follows:
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where '
'
ij
ijij
ij
P
Y . )( ijYF is a cumulative distribution
function, and )( ijYf is a probability density function.
We assume that the manufacturer knows partial
information of quality. Therefore, variance of reliability
ij satisfies this relation : ijij
'
We calculate the best reaction functions of suppliers
by obtaining first derivative Eq.(9) of with respect to . 
Then, we can obtain:
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By simplifying the equation, the function is written as 
follows:
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Because 0
ij
j , we can obtain the critical point of (9)
when 0
ij
j
In a similar way, we can also obtain:                                                                                       
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3.3. Worst case
The worst case is also considered in this paper so that 
the manufacturer could make pessimistic                                                                   decisions               
according to its business strategies. The worst case is
that actual quantity of defective components is much 
larger than the manufacturer expected. In other words,
ijij PRe . The manufacturer should determine an upper 
bound of this situation in order to design optimal
production planning. Therefore, chance constraint is
utilized to estimate uncertainty of defective components.
The chance constraint in this paper is to give the upper 
bound when the production cannot be completely
achieved. The addition constraint for the manufacturer to
estimate worst case is expressed by
ijijij PRe ]Pr[
where ij is a upper bound on the probability which is
decided by decision makers. The chance-constraint is
given to estimate the probability of worse situations
realized quantity of defective components is greater than 
estimation, and the probability is bounded by ij . 
In order to facilitate the calculation of chance-
constraint, we reformulate the equation into a form 
introduced by Petkov and Maranas [11]. The chance-
constraint is equivalently written as
ijijY 1)(
where the right-hand side )( ijY is a normal cumulative
distribution function followed by ),( 2'' ijij . The
cumulative normal distribution is recasted into the
standardizing normal form. 2'
'
ij
ijij
ij
P
Y where 'ij is 
mean value of ijRe and
'
ij is variance of ijRe .
Thus,  )1(1 ijijY which is equivalent to 
0)1( '1' ijijijij P (12) 
The formulation for the worst case is considered by 
embedding chance-constraint Eq. (12) into the function 
for the average case. The resulting formulation is
)],0[max()(
})()(
)()({max
1 1
1 1 1
1 0
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(13)
Subject to: (2), (5), (7), (11), (12)
4. Computational example
In order to illustrate the features of the model, we
conduct small sizes of computational examples. An
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Intel(R) Core2Duo E8400 3 GHz processor with 3GB
memory is used for the computation. The program is
coded by GAMS23.7 solving by CONOPT. 
We conduct three cases to analyse the impact of 
price responsiveness to demand ijB and price 
responsiveness to quality ijC for one unit component 
considering two scenarios (average case, worst case).
The comparison experiments are executed to show how
each parameter affects production and profit for the 
manufacturer when we change the parameter once for 
each case. The comparison results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Computational results
From the above table, we can observe that the
decrease of price responsiveness to quality drives the
increase of profits for both of average case and worst 
case. However, the quality of components is getting
worst. If price responsiveness to demand goes down, 
comparing case 1 with case 3, profits are significantly 
reduced. The reason is that if the price responsiveness to
demand is decreased, demand from the manufacturer 
becomes less sensitive to price of components for 
suppliers. Thus, suppliers could ask much higher price of 
components.  The quality becomes better. From the
computational results, we can conclude that it is very 
necessary to optimize demand and quality 
simultaneously for decision makers in order to obtain 
maximum profits. The optimal decisions for price
responsiveness to demand and quality are important for 
suppliers in order to encourage the manufacturer to
purchase more components.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a Stackelberg game theoretic model
under demand uncertainty with asymmetric quality
information is addressed. Our primary interest is to
investigate estimation technique while quality
information is asymmetric. The model formulation 
captures demand uncertainty from customers as well as
risk of poor quality. Due to asymmetric information, the
quality information of components purchased from 
suppliers is unknown for the manufacturer. Thus, the
manufacturer encounters uncertain amount of defective 
components after ordering.  However, suppliers know
complete information of quality of components. In order 
to estimate number of defective components, two
scenarios are introduced in the paper. We consider two 
scenarios: an average case and a worst case for the 
manufacturer to estimate uncertainty. Our work is a
general frame work to consider estimation approach in a 
game theoretic model. In the future, it is interesting to 
investigate more complex scenarios.
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Average 
case
A=120
B=0.6
C=0.5 
A=120
B=0.6
C=0.48
A=120
B=0.55
C=0.5
Profit 858.230 881.255 38.121 
Demand 30.187 30.127 30.187 
Quantity 3.213 3.199 3.213
Worst 
case
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Profit 286.621 312.385 -609.665
Demand 31.557 31.486 31.557 
Quality 3.229 3.214 3.229
